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NARROWING THE SCOPE OF CAPITAL MURDER DURING THE
COMMISSION OF A ROBBERY:
WHEN MUST THE INTENT TO ROB ARISE?
BY: ROBERTA F. GREEN

I. INTRODUCTION

Branch v. Commonwealth,2 a non-capital case, is the landmark
case in this area. In Branch, the Supreme Court of Virginia affirmed a
second degree murder conviction and reversed a robbery conviction.
The facts of the case were as follows. Defendant Paul Preston Branch IH
was entertaining a number of friends at his home. One of the guests had
brought along a firearm, which Branch took from him before allowing
him to enter the house. Thereafter, Branch maintained control of the gun.
As the evening progressed, an argument broke out between two of the
guests, and Branch brandished the weapon in order to subdue one of the
combatants, Jeffrey Ryder. However, the weapon discharged, killing
Ryder almost immediately. Branch "told the others that 'it was an
accident,' a stance he maintained throughout police interrogation and at
trial. ' 3 Subsequently, in an effort to impede the identification of the
body, Branch and his assembled guests went through Ryder's clothing,
wallet and automobile. Branch burned the contents of Ryder's wallet,
and then he and one of the guests deposited the body across town. In
deciding that Branch failed to have the requisite intent for robbery, the

court addressed two factors of particular importance: the principal
elements of robbery and the motive for the killing.
Citing Jonesv. Commonwealth,4 the Branchcourt defined robbery
and then divided it into its three principal elements: the taking, the intent
to steal, and the violence or intimidation. 5 The court found that these
three elements must occur in a particular temporal sequence. 6 That is,
the intent and the taking must exist simultaneously, and the violence must
occur before or at the time of the taking. Finally, the taking is not a
robbery unless the animusfurandi7 existed before or at the time of the
violence. 8 Considering the facts before them, the court found that
robbery had not motivated Branch's act of violence and agreed that he
had taken the victim's wallet only in an attempt to cover up the crime.9
The court held that "the violent killing and the unlawful taking were two
separate acts, performed for entirely different reasons." 1 0
The Virginia Supreme Court has recently clarified its position on
robbery and murder in George v.Commonwealth,1 1 in the process
distinguishing the facts of Branch from the facts in the case before it.
Defendant Michael Carl George was convicted of capital murder in the
commission of robbery while armed with a deadly weapon and was
sentenced to death. The victim in the case, a fifteen-year-old boy, had
been molested and murdered, and his motorcycle had been stolen.
Finding that the murder was inextricably related "in time, place and
causal connection to the robbery," the court held that the "killing became
part of the same criminal enterprise as the robbery.... George was
motivated by the dual purpose of molesting [the victim] sexually and
13
robbing him."' 12 Therefore, the court affirmed George's conviction.
Together Branch and George serve as guides for distinguishing
when a robbery and a killing are two separate acts and when they are part
of the same criminal enterprise. In these cases, among others, the
Virginia Supreme Court has made clear that the determination of capital
murder premised on robbery relies on several factual distinctions. Where
the facts support the designation of the robbery and the murder as two
unrelated acts, the robbery subsection of the capital murder statute will
not apply. Conversely, where the facts and defendant's motivation show
the robbery and the killing as part of the same criminal enterprise, the

I Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31(4) (1991). For a clear analysis of the
crime ofrobbery in Virginia (both as separate crime and as capital murder
predicate), see Mosely and Richardson, Robbery, Rape andAbduction:
Alone andAs Predicate Offenses to CapitalMurder, Capital Defense
Digest, Vol. 2, No. 2 (1990).
2 225 Va. 91,300 S.E.2d 758 (1983).
3 Id. 93,300 S.E. 2d at 759.
4 172 Va. 615, 618, 1 S.E.2d 200, 301 (1939). See also Johnsonv.
Commonwealth, 209 Va. 291, 163 S.E.2d 570 (1968).
5 Branch, 225 Va. at 94-5, 300 S.E.2d at 759.
6 Id.
7 Intent to steal.
8 Id.
9 Id. at 95, 300 S.E.2d at 760.
10 Branch, 225 Va. at 95, 300 S.E.2d at 760 (emphasis added).
The year before the Branch case, the court considered Whitley v.
Commonwealth, 223 Va. 66, 286 S.E.2d 162 (1982), which also adds
meaning to the capital murder designation. Richard Lee Whitley was
convicted in the death of his neighbor on the charge of capital murder
during robbery while armed with a dangerous weapon. Id. at 66, 286
S.E.2d at 164 (citing Va. Code Ann. § 18.2-31 (d) (1981). Whitley argued

that the taking (stealing his neighbor's car) had been an after-thought,
that his intent had been solely to kill his neighbor. While the Virginia
Supreme Court in Whitley stated that "violence or intimidation must
precede orbe concomitant with the taking," id. at 73, 286 S.E.2d at 166,
as robbery is a crime against the person ofthe victim rather than against
property, the court found that a corpse remains a "person" if the "'taking
occurs minutes after the victim is killed,' so it is immaterial that the
victim is dead when the theft occurs." Id. (quoting Ridley v. Commonwealth, 219 Va. 834, 836, 252 S.E.2d 313, 314 (1979)). See also
Harwardv. Commonwealth, 229 Va. 363,330 S.E.2d 89 (1985) (providing dicta that a killing "before, during, and after" a felony falls within "in
the commission of' the felony). Therefore, finding a strict temporal
analysis unnecessary, the Whitley court went on to consider the motive
for the killing, i.e., "whether robbery was the motive for the killing."
Whitley, 223 Va. at 73, 286 S.E.2d at 166. The Whitley court approved
the use of circumstantial evidence for proving motive and found that
Whitley had been specifically motivated for both the killing and the
robbing. Id.
1 242 Va. 264, 411 S.E.2d 12 (1991).
12 Id. at 280,411 S.E.2d at 21 (emphasis added).
13 Id. at 285, 411 S.E.2d at 24.

In Virginia, "the willful, deliberate, and premeditated killing of any
person in the commission of robbery or attempted robbery while armed
with a deadly weapon" is capital murder. 1 While the statute is clear on
the relationship between killing during a robbery and capital murder,
Virginia case law has shown the statute to be more difficult to interpret
in terms of the time frame inherent in the phrase "in the commission of'
and in terms of the requisite intent. To capital defense attorneys, the
timing and intent distinctions are particularly important in that they offer
a window of opportunity for separating a killing from the robbery that
anchors it within the boundaries of capital murder. Therefore, this brief
article will outline Virginia case law on a killing "in the commission of
robbery" and will suggest arguments for counsel to raise in attempting to
narrow the scope of the capital murder statute.
II. CURRENT VIRGINIA CASE LAW
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capital murder designation is appropriate. Therefore, a Virginia practitioner defending against a capital murder charge predicated on robbery
will want to argue that the facts of the case, especially the timing of the
defendant's intent, indicate that the murder was not motivated by the
robbery and, therefore, the killing was not "in the commission of' the
robbery. While the facts of the case are the key, other arguments are
available to help narrow the capital murder statute's application.
III. ARGUMENTS FOR NARROWLY CONSTRUING
THE CAPITAL MURDER STATUTE
At least three arguments are available for narrowing the court's
application of the capital murder statute if the Commonwealth should
argue that it need not prove the co-existence ofthe intent to kill and intent
to steal. 14 First, as the court is bound by the plain meaning of the statute,
an argument to the actual wording may prove compelling. Second,
counsel may want to argue that neither the deterrent nor retribution
purposes of the statute is served if a killing is unrelated to the robbery that
anchors it in capital murder. Finally, the third argument grows from the
constitutional mandate that statutes defining eligibility for capital punishment must draw meaningful distinctions between capital and noncapital offenses.
A. The Plain Meaning of the Statutory Language
Virginia Code Section 18.2-31(4) specifies that the killing must
occur "in the commission of' a robbery or an attempted robbery. A
conventional understanding of "commission" is the "doing... [of] a
criminal act." 15 Placing this language into the statute, "in the commission" would then require that the intent to steal arise before or during the
killing and would exclude an intent to rob that arose after the killing.
After all, how can one kill in the process of "doing" a robbery if the
robbery has not yet occurred - in fact, has not even begun - at the time
of the killing?
The court is bound in its interpretation to follow the plain meaning
of the statute, and the capital murder statute's plain meaning negates its
use where an intent to rob arises after the killing. The statute requires that
the robbery be underway when the killing occurs. Therefore, any
continuing enterprise analysis that draws on intent arising after the
killing runs counter to the plain meaning of the capital murder statute and
would involve the judiciary overstepping the proper bounds of statutory
interpretation.
B. The Statute's Deterrent and Retribution Effects
Arguably, the capital murder statute, as it incorporates robbery, can
be seen as serving deterrence and retribution goals. First, including
killings that occur in the course of a robbery within the rubric of capital
murder arguably will deter robberies and killings during robberies, as
persons will know of the increased penalty awaiting them in the capital
murder statute. Second, those who undertake robberies can be seen as
having sufficiently "evil minds" as to warrant retribution by the death

14 In Whitley, the Commonwealth argued that intent to rob can arise
after the killng if part of a "continuing criminal enterprise." The Virginia
Supreme Court referred to the argument as "viable" but did not decide the
issue since it found the murder was committed with an intent to rob.
Whitley, 223 Va. at 73, 286 S.E.2d at 166.
15 Black's Law Dictionary 272 (6th ed. 1990). See also Webster's
Dictionary (3rd ed. 1986) (defining "commission" as "the act of committing, performing or doing").
f6 Enmundv.Florida,458 U.S. 782,783 (1982). See alsoSaunders
v. Commonwealth, 242 Va. 107 (1991) (citing Enmund for the proposi-

penalty if a killing occurs. Neither purpose, however, is served where the
killing is not motivated by the robbery.
The theory that robbers will be deterred from committing robbery,
or that they will commit the robbery more "safely" because they know the
death penalty awaits them if someone is killed, makes little sense if the
intent for robbery does not arise until after the killing. How can an acthere, robbery - be deterred if it was not intended in the first place? The
United States Supreme Court used similar reasoning when it found the
death penalty unconstitutional for accomplices to felony murder where
a killing was nothighly foreseeable: "[I]t is unlikely that the threat of the
death penalty for murder will measurably deter one who does not...
intend to kill,' 16 and in fact, "it seems likely that 'capital punishment can
serve as a deterrent only when murder is the result of premeditation and
17
deliberation.'
Moreover, if the purpose is to punish the culpability of robbers who
kill during the robbery because they were out to break the law in the first
place, the statute would serve no purpose when applied to a killing where
the robbery motive occurs after the killing has already taken place. The
only remaining retribution purpose is focused on the fact that a killing
took place, but that rationale would make every murder subject to the
death penalty. As the next point makes clear, such a broad retribution
justification would be unconstitutional.
C. The Constitutional Mandate
The United States Supreme Court has repeatedly held that capital
statutes must provide a "meaningful basis" for distinguishing capital
murder from non-capital murder. 18 For this constitutionally mandated
"meaningful distinction" to exist with reference to Section 18.2-31(4),
the statute must be read to include only those robberies intended at the
time of the killing. If an intent to rob does not arise until after the killing,
nothing about the killing itself can be seen as justifying the ultimate
sanction of the death penalty. The killing, without more, becomes
indistinguishable from any other killing. Thus, for Virginia's statute to
meaningfully distinguish between murder and capital murder, it must be
interpreted as referring only to cases where the intent to rob arises prior
to or concomitant with the killing.
IV. CONCLUSION
Defense counsel facing a capital murder charge predicated on
robbery will find their arguments against such a charge buttressed by
strong Virginia Supreme Court language stating that the intent to rob
must exist before or at the time of the killing, regardless of when the
taking actually occurs. Furthermore, while the Commonwealth has
argued that intent can arise later, adopting the "continuing criminal
enterprise" concept, defense counsel will want to consider the facts and
the circumstantial evidence related to motivation in order to argue that in
fact the killing and the robbery were two separate acts. The test, as
adopted by the Virginia Supreme Court, remains defendant's motivation
at the time of the killing, as "the offense is not robbery unless the animus
furandi was conceived before or at the time the violence was committed." 19

tion of common criminal design).
17 Id. at 799 (quoting Fisherv. United States, 328 U.S. 463, 484
(1946) (Frankfurter, J., dissenting)).
18 Greggv.Georgia,428U.S. 153,188 (1976) (opinion ofStewart,
J., joined by Blackmun, Powell, and Stevens, J.J.) (quoting Furman v.
Georgia, 408 U.S. 238, 313 (1972)(White, J., concurring)). See also
Godfrey v. Georgia, 446 U.S. 420,427 (1980).
1
9Branchv. Commonwealth, 225 Va. 91,95,300 S.E.2d 758,759
(1983).
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Beyond the facts of the case at hand and the Virginia case law,
counsel will want to argue that the plain meaning and the purposes of
Section 18.2-31 (4) support a finding that the intent to rob must arise
either before or during the killing. Moreover, such a reading ofthe statute

is mandated by the U.S. Supreme Court's narrowing construction expressed in Gregg and Godfrey. In order to clearly distinguish capital
murderfromageneralkilling, theintenttorobmustbeinplaceatthetime
of the killing and not after.

CHRONOLOGICAL OUTLINE OF A CAPITAL MURDER TRIAL
BY: RHONDA L. OVERSTREET

The text outline included in this issue of the Capital Defense Digest designates in chronological order a general guide of steps to follow in litigating
a capital trial. At each step there is a detailed set of points which counsel should evaluate when preparing for trial or appellate review. These points are
provided as an attempt to inform counsel of the various issues which often arise during trial. Many of these issues address motions and actions which are
mandatory on the part of counsel, and others simply suggest trial strategy. The reader will also take note that under several of the stages, an annotation
section is provided. These annotations refer to cases which have come out of the Virginia Court of Appeals. Although specific death penalty issues are
treated mainly by the Supreme Court of Virginia, these annotations include cases in which lowercourts address issues generally applicable to most criminal
trials, including capital cases. The purpose behind listing the court of appeals cases is to provide counsel with an additional resource for formulating
arguments. As is often the case, the language in Virginia Supreme Court decisions may not be favorable, and therefore these cases give counsel another
source for mounting arguments and challenges to certain criminal issues. Specifically, annotations have been developed on jury matters, including voir
dire and Batson issues, discovery, state habeas and procedural default.
The flow chart which follows sets out nine potential stages which occur in a capital murder case. Designated below each particular stage is a listing
ofcritical points which should be considered and addressed during the applicable time period. This list, however, is not comprehensive and does not suggest
every issue that may have importance during a certain stage in the case.

I.

ARREST

II.

BAIL
A.

§ 19.2-126 - the bail section referring to capital murder. However the statute directs the capital defendant to § 19.2-123(A), the second
paragraph.

B.

Although the defendant technically possesses right to bail at pre-trial, there is little chance in reality of getting out on ball.

I. PRELIMINARY HEARING
A.

Arrest before Indictment- § 19.2-218
An accused arrested upon a warrant charging Capital Murder is statutorily entitled to a Preliminary Hearing before he can be indicted.

B.

The requirement for a Preliminary Hearing is procedural, not jurisdictional, and therefore, any defect in connection with it (including
failure to hold it) must be raised before trial or be deemed waived.

C.

When thecasebegins with an indictment, §19.2-218 is not implicated. Once indictmentisreturned, the usual procedure is issuance of acapias.

IV. INDICTMENT

V.

A.

If there is any defect or any variance between the allegations therein and the evidence offered in proof, the court may permit amendment before jury returns verdict.

B.

Various pre-trial motions concerning the indictment, including a defect in the charge must be made pre-trial. Please see the Pre-trial
section for further details.

PRE-TRIAL PROCEDURE
A.

Under Virginia law, several types of issues must be raised pretrial. Virginia courts are extremely strict in applying these procedural
rules. An issue that is not timely raised is almost certainly defaulted. If waived under state law, it cannot be federally reviewed.

B.

Since additional federal review is almost certain in a capital case, it is important to preserve all federal issues for appellate review.
Therefore federalize all claims at this stage.

C.

Virginia Supreme Court Rule 3A:9 governs pre-trial practice

